written by David Zlutnick and Ian Paul of the Friendly Fire Collective, 4/25/08
As an anti-war movement, we find ourselves pouring our energy and time into mobilizations which result in isolated days of spectacular actions. We attempt to achieve short-term goals but without the necessary collectively developed long-term vision needed for a sustainable anti-war movement. At times these actions may be able to accomplish goals of their own, yet we must ensure that they are being carried out in the most effective manner possible and at the same time advance us in the achievement of our broader objectives. If our strategy is to build a movement—a movement capable of destroying the state’s capacity to wage wars—then we must be critical of our organizing and gauge its effectiveness by its capacity to build a successful antiwar movement. What follows is our perspective of the actions of M19, our experience of organizing within DASW, what mistakes we feel were made, and how we think we can best move forward to continue to create a radical space for radical action.
Short-term Goals
To start we should examine what we feel were two of the main short-term goals of the day’s actions: to bring attention to the war’s fifth anniversary and to disrupt the normal operations of war profiteers in our city.
The first explicit goal in organizing a day of actions specifically on M19 was that of bringing attention to the fifth anniversary of the war. While this was fairly successful, with several newspapers and television stations covering the day’s events, most of the coverage had a condescending and paternal tone, patting us on the back for not causing too much trouble or making note of our low turnout. Due to the structure of the corporate media it was only possible to have minor influence in the tone of the coverage—leading us to question the value of expending large amounts of energy around developing a strategy of engagement with the corporate media in the first place. However the large volume of coverage that did appear in mainstream media leads us to believe the media strategy was fairly successful in bringing attention to the anniversary, and accomplished its own set goals.
Switching to the objective of disrupting the war profiteers, a variety of tactics were employed including a snake march, bike bloc, paint-bombings, use of U-locks on building entrances, and most notably sit-ins, lock-downs, and die-ins—all with varying degrees of success. First let’s examine these actions on their ability to interrupt the business of the war profiteers. The question is: was this accomplished and was it done in the best manner possible?
When asking ourselves if there was significant disruption of war profiteers on M19 we have to answer “no.” While it was exciting to see the largest deployment of civil disobedience in San Francisco since the war began, most of the actions remained purely symbolic and left profiteers open for business. The majority of the actions occurred on Market St., and while being within sight of their intended targets they failed to significantly disrupt normal operations. These actions did effectively close Market St. for long durations, yet the goal was to disrupt the business of profiteers, not shut down the financial district as it was in 2003. What’s more, in those occurrences when entrances were successfully disabled to a certain extent, they were typically to large office buildings where the offices of the targets were left to conduct their business undisturbed.
Most of the strategy for this day was centered on the use of explicitly nonviolent direct action through mass arrest to shut down targeted areas, coupled with a snake march to support the blockades as well as provide a space for the general public to plug into the protests. In examining the day’s events we see several ways in which the methods used could have been improved.
To begin, we must recognize the fact that many potential targets were missed for two reasons: 1) a lack of communication and poor coordination between affinity groups, and 2) the feeling among some groups that they may be unwelcome in DASW’s actions because of tactical differences. (Both of these will be discussed in greater detail later.)
In one example we feel expresses the lack of tactical synergy that took place, the snake march arrived to support an action occurring at the Chevron office building where several individuals were blocking one of the entrances with lock-boxes. Soon the blockade was dismantled and the group was arrested. However, the building entrances remained blocked by the march itself after the arrests, an unintended effect that ultimately proved to do a better job of shutting down the building than the lock-down. Following this incident the snake march returned to its role as support never realizing its full potential. What this shows is that the arrests were more than likely unnecessary and shows the power the snake march could have possessed if it had been thought of in a different sense, namely as a means of disruption itself instead of as a support.
By framing the snake march beforehand as a support structure for other actions, it created an atmosphere of being merely spectators while the “real” action took place in the form of civil disobedience. Many of those who participated in the march and expected to play a disruptive role themselves, found themselves as an audience to the pre-planned direct actions, greatly limiting the extent to which the actions were in fact participatory. Looking forward, we should attempt to develop tactics that while being open and participatory, while also aiming to accomplish concrete objectives.
Movement Building
From our experience preparing for M19, our perception is that a long-term goal of the organizing and the day’s actions was to contribute to the general (re)construction of the anti-war movement. Despite the obvious positivity to be taken from the reemergence of this type of organizing, in terms of bringing new people into the anti-war movement we believe this was not accomplished.
To start, the majority, if not all of us organizing under the banner of DASW had some experience in anti-war organizing prior to this effort. Second, it is probably safe to assume most of those who attended DASW’s actions on M19 had most likely been to anti-war protests in the past and doubtfully will become more active in this organizing process if they have not already done so at some point over the past five years. At the same time we must recognize that for the select few who were attending their first protest, it was probably a great experience (and was for a few we spoke with) and hopefully did encourage them to become more active. Yet we must also recognize this was undoubtedly an extremely small number. For the rest of those present we can assume they will not take a more active position as a result of M19 and merits taking a look at why this may be the case.
In examining why most participants in the M19 protests, outside of those affiliated with DASW, will presumably not further participate in organizing as a result of this day, we believe there are two leading reasons: 1) the exclusionary side-effect of the primary tactic of mass arrests, and 2) the lack of tangibility of the chosen methods to make any significant dent in the war machine.
Although never said outright, to many it was perceived that the main actions of the day and those that would be officially condoned by DASW would be those engaging in lock-downs, die-ins, sit-ins, etc., all of which result in near-certain arrest. As a result, those such as ourselves who were willing to risk arrest but not engage in certain arrest felt we were unable to fully participate in the day because we did not want to lock-down. It was unclear how best we and others could most effectively coordinate with other actions, especially as there was the underlying assumption that many of our ideas for disruption may not be condoned or recognized as part of DASW as they would not fit into the category of “civil disobedience.”
As a result it left many to participate in solely the public actions of the day such as the snake march. Although the idea of the snake march was to incorporate those not participating in the smaller actions, many felt as though this was merely a sideshow to the main event. Additionally, many, including ourselves, felt disconnected from the die-ins, watching as people were arrested and dragged away, leaving an increasingly smaller number of disempowered allies to stand on the side-walk and participate primarily as spectators.
From discussions we have had with individuals since M19—specifically who have not participated in significant anti-war organizing themselves but have been present since before the invasion in 2003 and also participated on the fifth anniversary—we have taken that many in the anti-war community coming from both from the most militant as well as the more “liberal” (versus radical) sections are tired of using the same tactics that have been proven ineffective. While they may have turned out this time to support DASW’s day of action, continuous disappointments will not encourage them to become involved in the organizing process, much less to return to support future actions.
Besides the strategy of engaging in civil disobedience, we feel the snake march also played into this notion of “old tactics.” Because the march was determined to remain un-permitted (and thanks to the amazing performances from street theater groups and marching bands) the energy was able to stay relatively high. Nevertheless, the approach of an all-inclusive protest—under which there was an assumed prohibition on any actions that would seem to endanger the march—closely resembled that of the prototypical San Francisco anti-war march, with a beginning and an end and an unclear purpose or objective to be realized. This being the case, and this being the main “inclusive” action of the day, unfortunately many would just assume to attend the ANSWER march after work, which they did in far greater numbers.
After M19 there were some hostile feelings from members of DASW towards ANSWER resulting in the perception that they had moved in on our day. Even if this was the case and we collectively had the desire to monopolize the fifth anniversary (which would be a horrible mistake), we can’t blame ANSWER for drawing more people to their march. This is what ANSWER does: they have mass rallies and marches against the war to incorporate anyone who wants to show in some way that they disapprove of US occupation. In DASW we aim to be something different—an organization that focuses on direct action. More than just demonstrating against the war, our goal is ultimately to stop it. So should we not use different tactics?
Another important question to ask when looking at M19 is: who were we attempting to incorporate into our actions? Ideally, yes, we would like everyone to turn out, but realistically we are not expecting to be able to turn out a crowd completely representative of San Francisco including everybody from Marina yuppies to Mission day-laborers. With a group entitled Direct Action to Stop the War advertising a “day of action to disrupt war profiteers” we are, intentionally or not, engaging a very specific audience: activists. Keeping this in mind we must not only find new ways in our organizing to appeal to this general community to begin (re)organizing either with us or independently but also utilize this group in our planning, knowing they are present not just to show their opposition to the war but to act against it.
And looking again at the tactic of civil disobedience, if it is in fact our goal to include those groups we most often claim to want to involve or attempt to connect the war to their issues of primary concern—that is namely immigrants, communities of color, and more generally, the working class—we must look at the exclusionary effect of this method specific to these populations. This unintended exclusion is often due to additional obligations individuals may have to low-wage jobs without having the freedom to miss work or to family concerns requiring their inability to spend significant time in jail. Other times it may be due to status, such as being an undocumented immigrant or other legal concerns. But often the main reason for this inability or lack of desire to participate is purely financial. Even those who may be willing to risk citation or other legal consequences would not engage in an action that would definitely result in arrest because of their economic standing, where certainly being subject to a massive fine, court or attorney’s fees, or simply time taken from work is not a reasonable possibility.1 Again, we repeat that these groups may be willing to participate in arrestable actions and often do, but since the consequences are potentially higher they are less likely to take these risks on actions that often prove to be purely symbolic. Thus, as we saw, the mass arrests on M19 were largely the same individuals, or at least principally coming from similar communities, who have taken part in numerous other actions over the years.
Group Dynamics
DASW’s commitment to maintaining a nonhierarchical structure and its focus on decentralization is one of its greatest strengths. At the same time, however, we noticed through our experiences operating within this structure that often times there was a lack of communication leading to preventable problems that should be addressed.
First, in the coordination of actions there was a breakdown in communication between affinity groups over which targets had been claimed and what sort of action was to take place. This led at least our affinity group to hesitate too long in planning for M19 by attempting to gain enough information to not overlap or conflict with another group’s action, which ultimately resulted in a severe draw-down in our capabilities for the day. The decided upon mode for affinity groups to share information was through a “double-blind” who could receive basic information such as what targets were being hit and when and then pass this on to other affinity groups. Some actions of course require utmost secrecy and so may not always be able to be shared, but even the most benign and public actions it seems did not efficiently use this system, or if they did that information was not effectively disseminated.
Much confusion surrounded the snake march as well because of poor communication. Until only a couple nights before the action it appeared there was general confusion about how many snake marches there would be, who was coordinating the other rumored march(es), where these would be going, or even what their goals were. Again, for at least our affinity group, this meant being unable to concretely decide upon our action until the last minute. This sort of uncertainty resulted from the lack of communication that was needed for a decentralized organization to successfully inform each other of essential information.
While the decentralized aspect of DASW is key to its organizing structure this also led to certain individuals or affinity groups having to take on large amounts of work, thereby having a disproportionate say in the planning process. This led to a lack of transparency that in turn resulted in individuals or affinity groups making decisions on their own, bypassing necessary general discussions that should have taken place, and shaping the character of the day’s actions—albeit, only so much responsibility should be placed upon these groups as they were more or less delegated to do so by the general DASW membership. The most striking example of this may have been the comms team in which it has surfaced may have refused to relay information regarding the paint-bombing of an office building over the text-loop because they did not recognize this as an action and did not want to “encourage this type of behavior.” To our knowledge, their right to select what information would and would not be sent out was never explicitly determined in a general meeting. However it should be mentioned, the comms incident may itself have resulted from a lack of communication within DASW as to what its parameters were and how it was to be used.2
One last issue that we would like to address within this section was the absence of discussion surrounding key issues that were essential to matters of participation and effectiveness. The questions that should have been discussed include at least the following:
-what tactics are most effective in accomplishing our goals?
-should DASW condone or condemn actions based on their adherence to nonviolence?
-what specifically is to be designated under the term “nonviolent” (for example, is property destruction or defacement nonviolent? are material blockades nonviolent? what about self-defense should the need arise? should this be accepted?)
Instead DASW developed a strict adherence to a vague concept of nonviolence without really working through what implications this would have regarding levels of involvement from outside the group and success in reaching our objectives.
Moving Forward
M19 was an important day for the anti-war movement in San Francisco. Despite what criticisms we may be laying out in this text, we feel that the day was a success in the sense that it signifies a new beginning for war resistance in the Bay Area, and showed that there are still lots of dedicated people passionate about participating. We don’t want to be a force that simply deconstructs actions after the fact, but rather we desire to participate in a much-needed (and we feel absent) critical dialogue about our movement. If we are to successfully build a radical movement that will be a significant force in society, we must be willing to evolve both our ideas and tactics as the situation and context changes. We feel that M19 was largely a repetition of the same mistakes that have been made both prior to Iraq’s invasion and since, and it’s time to imagine new ways to throw wrenches into the gears of war, thinking positively yet critically about our past organizing.
We, too, are struggling with how we can imagine a (re)construction of an effective strategy five years after the war began – one that acts as a catalyst for resistance not just in the minds of activists, but in everyone who is against the war. We are the first to admit that we don’t have all of the “answers”, and we vehemently oppose anyone who claims to – we feel that the path forward exists somewhere in the space between all of the different positions that may be presented. We hope this article serves as a flashpoint with which conversations will continue to occur surrounding how best to proceed from here, and more importantly, what strategies we can employ to dismantle the capacity for waging wars in the first place. This being said, we offer the following conclusions we have drawn as points of departure in the examination of strategy that may prove helpful future organizing.
It should be recognized that the decentralized structure of DASW is one of its biggest strengths, and allows it to be open and participatory to all types of resistors. Unfortunately, the clear lack of effective communication and coordination between different working groups and affinity groups is something that we feel must be seriously examined when looking to future actions. We must develop structures that will ensure opportunities for both group discussion as well as tactical coordination are at the front of our minds when conducting meetings. The use of an affinity group structure was successful as well, although the lack of a large mass action that would participate in the shutting down of profiteers was a problem and left many feeling disempowered. Our horizontal and decentralized networks have proved invaluable in mobilizations and actions around the world, and we feel we must continually develop these structures and strategies if we are to be successful in moving forward.
What we saw on M19 was a day of action that limited itself almost exclusively to the tactics of mass arrest as civil disobedience, often supported by feelings that other types of action may provoke police violence. While DASW effectively provided the means for a variety of civil disobedience actions to occur, a de facto ban on tactics outside of the realm of mass arrest developed that quickly excluded more militant parts of the movement from participating. This unofficial condemnation resulted in a near-monopoly of the use of arrests as a strategy for disruption. The result was a limitation in our approach to achieving the day’s goals with much the same response—despite the use of completely non-violent tactics, the demonstration was still attacked by police. This shows we cannot simply blame police violence on “provocateurs” or militant resistance as if they somehow deserve the repression by provoking it – the state’s capacity and desire to enact violence on those that oppose it will always exist, and we must work together to develop strategies to not only survive this repression but defend against it.
We feel that perhaps the largest mistake made during the fifth anniversary was the lack of an acceptance for a complete and open diversity of tactics. To actively close off parts of our movement because of internal disagreement is effectively doing the state’s job for them. We must recognize that every action against the war is one more blow against it, and we must provide the space and capacity for all forms of resistance within our movement. From the sidewalks to the streets, from die-ins to material blockades, from all-inclusive marches to black blocs, a better effort should have been made to make room for all of these tactics so not as to act against one another, but rather to benefit each other on the street in the most effective ways possible.
We believe the strategy we set forth for M19 was largely a repetition of tactics that have continually proved ineffective in accomplishing our set goals of substantially disrupting any of the targets. The tactics used in 2003, most notably lock-downs, breakaway marches, etc., have been largely neutralized by the SFPD and have lost what effectiveness they once possessed. When presented with a specific set of goals for an action, our organizing should stay open-minded in the consideration of which tactics would be the most effective within the specific context. The insistence on using lockdowns or other forms of mass arrest as a means of disruption closes off the possibility for more effective tactics to emerge. In some cases this may still be the best method to use in accordance with our objectives, and other times we may want to look elsewhere.
From what we have written we are hoping to make a positive impact upon DASW by interjecting our thoughts and promoting discussion within the organization as well as within the larger anti-war community. We would like nothing more than to see DASW be a strong cluster of individuals and groups from many backgrounds representing many different strains of political thought. We want it to be a space where those committed to ending continued US militarism can come together and employ an effective campaign of direct action—a campaign able to successfully make our government have to think twice before engaging in military action. To do so we believe there must be open dialogue within organizing spaces over issues of strategy, and so we encourage all who read this to discuss our words and add their own thoughts in hopes of bringing our movement forward.
Footnotes:
[1] – On another note we should look at the possibilities for the use of funds used to pay citations, where there is a direct transfer of our hard-earned money to the state. For example, if the money the arrestees from M19 may have to pay was donated directly to DASW then our organization would have been financially secure. We would not have had to engage in fundraisers and individuals would not have had to eat costs that may have gone without reimbursement, unless of course these were voluntary contributions in addition to our self-funding. What’s more, DASW could have had a bail fund for instances of genuine police repression if activists were targeted and charged with serious offenses. All of this, of course, is for another discussion.
[2] – Shifting tones for a moment, we would like to note how incredible the infrastructure was for this action. The legal teams, the medics, the press liaisons, the comms team, and everyone else, no matter our critique in this section we feel the group did an amazing job of providing support for M19 and we sincerely thank everyone for their hard work.
